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Abstract
The Human Tissue Authority can authorise a bone marrow harvest on a child of any age if a person with parental
responsibility consents to the procedure. Older children have the legal capacity to consent to medical procedures under
Gillick, but it is unclear if Gillick can be applied to non-therapeutic medical procedures. The relevant donation guidelines
state that the High Court shall be consulted in the event of a disagreement, but what is in the best interests of the
teenage donor under s.1 of the Children Act 1989? There are no legal authorities on child bone marrow harvests in the
United Kingdom. This article considers the best interests of the older saviour sibling and questions whether, for
the purposes of welfare, the speculative benefits could outweigh the physical burdens.
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Introduction
It is settled law that if an older child is Gillick compe-
tent she can consent to a medical procedure. There is an
assumption, however, that the medical procedure is in
her best interests. Bone marrow harvests pose a unique
legal problem in that they provide no therapy to the
donor. Babies and toddlers cannot experience physical
or psychological beneﬁts making their harvests ques-
tionable in law (outside the ambit of this article), but
older children may glean a psychological beneﬁt by
acting as a saviour sibling (the term ‘‘saviour sibling’’
refers to a child who is harvested to save its brother or
sister from a debilitating disease). The saviour sibling
may, therefore, be born naturally and found to be a
match later, or created speciﬁcally for harvest using
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis under the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended).
The Human Tissue Authority (HT Authority) recom-
mends that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court
is sought only if there is a disagreement, bestowing
maximum discretion upon parents and transplant
teams.1–3
There are three potential legal routes to consent for
older child donors: (i) Gillick consent may be applicable
to non-therapeutic medical procedures; (ii) a parental
consent may override a teenage refusal to validate the
procedure (subjective), or (iii) the High Court may
decide what is in the best interests of the child (object-
ive). There has not been a test case in the UK yet. In the
United States, however, the leading authority of Curran
v Bosze (1990) 566 N.E.2d 1319 conﬁrms that the
saviour sibling must have a loving connection to the
sick sibling and awareness in the present of a beneﬁt,
per Calvo J at pages 1343–4.4 Re Y (Mental Patient:
Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam 110 did accept
psychological beneﬁts but the case concerned an incom-
petent adult, making the outcome in a child case highly
speculative.
This article examines the donation guidelines under
the HT Authority, the reach of Gillick, and the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court. It will be concluded that
the harvest of bone marrow from older children may
not be supported under the current law.5
The HT Authority
The current rules for bone marrow harvests upon chil-
dren are published by the HT Authority. A child is
anyone under the age of 18 according to its Code of
Practice 2014.6 Donations from children who are not
competent to give consent must be approved by the HT
Authority but competent children can be ‘‘approved
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locally’’, placing a signiﬁcant burden on the transplant
unit to correctly diagnose Gillick competence (at para-
graphs 27 and 26). The HT Authority advise the
following:
Paragraph 75: The assessment of ‘‘competence’’ of the
potential child donor should be determined by the bone
marrow transplant unit. Children competent to give
consent are considered ‘‘Gillick competent’’.
Paragraph 76: In the Gillick case, the court held that a
child was considered competent to give valid consent to
a proposed intervention if they had suﬃcient intelli-
gence and understanding to enable them to fully under-
stand what was involved.
It is perfectly conceivable that teenage donors have suf-
ﬁcient intelligence to fully understand what is involved
in a bone marrow donation. These mature characteris-
tics help them to form psychological beneﬁts in the
guise of altruism, pride, or happiness. It is advised
by the HT Authority, to prevent undue inﬂuence,
that older donors are interviewed alone (at
paragraph 79).
Interestingly, refusals are not mentioned by the
guidelines. A parent can only consent on behalf
of a competent child if that child ‘‘fails to reach’’ a
decision (at paragraph 81). In the event that the child
issues a competent refusal, it may be classiﬁed as a
‘‘dispute’’:
Paragraph 85: Where there is any dispute between
people with parental responsibility or any doubt as to
the child’s best interests, the matter should be referred
to the court for approval.
Paragraph 109: If the court is asked to consider the
matter, the welfare of the prospective donor child will
be the court’s paramount consideration and not the
welfare of the recipient. The ‘‘welfare checklist’’
which is set out in the Children Act 1989 will be con-
sidered by the court in determining the application.
It appears that if a competent child refuses a
bone marrow harvest, the High Court can apply the
welfare test:
Children Act 1989
Section 1: Welfare of the child.
(1) When a court determines any question with respect
to:
(a) the upbringing of a child; or
(b) the administration of a child’s property or the
application of any income from it, the child’s welfare
shall be the court’s paramount consideration.
(3) A court shall have regard in particular to:
(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child
concerned (considered in the light of his age and
understanding);
(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs;
(c) the likely eﬀect on him of any change in his
circumstances;
(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics
of which the court considers relevant;
(e) any harm which he has suﬀered or is at risk of
suﬀering;
(f) how capable each of his parents, and any other
person in relation to whom the court considers the
question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs.
This raises a host of important legal issues not dis-
cussed by the courts before: is a non-therapeutic bone
marrow harvest in the best interests of a child? Can the
plight of a sick sibling be incorporated into the welfare
test? Is a speculative psychological beneﬁt enough to
authorise the procedure in law?
The HT Authority statistics on child donations
show the following (these statistics were requested
from the HT Authority by the writer under the Data
Protection Act in January 2015 and delivered via
email):
Year
Child bone
marrow/blood stem
cell cases approved Cases rejected
2007–2008 71 0
2008–2009 57 0
2009–2010 78 0
2010–2011 67 0
2011–2012 68 0
2012–2013 69 0
2013–2014 78 0
It is unclear how many of these bone marrow dona-
tions are from children old enough to experience a
speculative psychological beneﬁt, but the consistent
zeros are a cause for concern.
Gillick competence
A child aged 16 cannot consent to blood and organ
donations under the Family Law Reform Act 1959 as
a result of the judgment in Re W(A Minor) (Medical
Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64:
Lord Donaldson: ‘‘The section [8] extends not only to
treatment, but also to diagnostic procedures: see sub-
section (2). It does not, however, extend to the
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donation of organs or blood since, so far as the donor
is concerned, these do not constitute either treatment or
diagnosis’’ (at page 78).
Nolan LJ: ‘‘The section does not cover, for example,
the giving of blood . . . the jurisdiction of the court
should always be invoked. I would say the same of a
case in which a child of any age consented to donate an
organ: such a case is not, of course, covered by section
8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969’’ (at pages 92
and 94).
The only alternative is a common law consent under
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health
Authority [1986] AC 112, as explained by Lord
Scarman:
‘‘ . . . the parental right to determine whether or not
their minor child below the age of 16 will have medical
treatment terminates if and when the child achieves a
suﬃcient understanding and intelligence to enable him
or her to understand fully what is proposed . . . ’’ (at
pages 188–189).
The HT Authority guidelines (above) state that a
Gillick competent child can consent to a bone
marrow donation, but this is not necessarily true.
The courts have frequently overruled the opinions of
teenagers because their competent decisions often lead
to more burdens than beneﬁts: Re R (A Minor)
(Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11;
Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1992] 2 FCR 219; Re W (A Minor) (Medical
Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64; Re E
(A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1994] 5
Med LR 73, and Re P (Minor) [2003] EWHC 2327.
The opinion of the child is not even considered in
some cases. In Re P (A Minor) [1986] 1 FLR 272
for example, Butler-Sloss LJ stated that the child’s
wishes should not be given ‘‘such paramount import-
ance’’ as to be conclusive (at page 279). In Re E (unre-
ported) 21 September 1990, Ward J directly addressed
the issue when he stated: ‘‘whether or not he is of
suﬃcient understanding to have given consent or to
withhold consent is not the issue for me’’ (this case is
taken from the judgment of Straughton LJ in Re R (A
Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992]
Fam 11 at page 28). Therefore, parents of older
saviour siblings (and the HT Authority) should not
necessarily rely on Gillick competence to validate a
bone marrow harvest in law. The lack of therapy dis-
tinguishes the harvest from other medical treatments,
and a speculative psychological beneﬁt has never been
conﬁrmed as an acceptable key to the lock of consent
for a bone marrow harvest on a child (per Lord
Donaldson MR in Re R [1992] Fam 11 at page 22:
‘‘consent itself creates no obligation to treat. It is
merely a key which unlocks a door’’).
Parental consent
The High Court has no problem in overruling parents
who do not put the needs of the child before their own.
The ‘‘reasonable and responsible parent’’ test was laid
down in Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical
Treatment) [1991] Fam 33, conﬁrming that parents
can often be subjective in their views, per Balcombe
LJ at pages 50 and 52. A starker warning was delivered
by Wilson J in the now iconic judgment of Re C (A
Child) (HIV Test) [2000] Fam 48 where a mother
refused to test her baby for HIV:
‘‘This case is not at its heart about the rights of the
parents. And if, as he in eﬀect suggested in his evidence,
the father regards the rights of a tiny baby as subsumed
within the rights of the parents, he is wrong. This baby
has rights of her own. They can be considered nationally
or internationally. Under our national law I must deter-
mine the case by reference to her welfare’’ (at page 61).
This decision is clear: the objective rights of the child
are not to be subsumed into the subjective ideals of the
parents. The most recent case to conﬁrm that the best
interests of the child are to be completely separated
from the ‘‘emotions and wishes’’ of the parents is An
NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507 (per Holman J at
paragraph 16), consolidating a passage from Wyatt v
Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ
1811. In support of this, a small group of cases has
developed whereby court approval must be sought
before the non-therapeutic medical procedure is carried
out (this was conﬁrmed by Dame Elizabeth Butler-
Sloss in Re J (Speciﬁc Orders: Child’s Religious
Upbringing and Circumcision) [2000] 1 FLR 571, at
paragraphs 31–32). Re W (A Minor) [1993] Fam 64
concerned a refusal from a competent minor, and
Nolan LJ was of the opinion that court intervention
was necessary:
‘‘Where major surgery or other procedures (such as
abortion) were proposed, and where the parents were
prepared to give consent but the child (having suﬃcient
understanding to make an informed decision) was not,
the jurisdiction of the court should always be invoked.
I would say the same of a case in which a child of any
age consented to donate an organ’’ (at page 94).
A bone marrow harvest would probably qualify for the
‘‘small group of important decisions’’ because it
involves an internal interference with the body under
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a general anaesthetic. Immunisations are to be added to
the group too: per Thorpe LJ in B (Child) [2003]
EWCA Civ 1148, at paragraph 17. However, according
to the HT Authority guidelines, a harvest can be
authorised on a competent child ‘‘locally’’ (at para-
graph 26). In light of the dubiousness surrounding
Gillick competence and non-therapeutic medical pro-
cedures, and the judicial approach to subjective par-
ents, it is submitted that High Court approval should
be sought in every child donation case to ensure the
objective best interests of the child.
The High Court
In the event that the case does reach court for approval,
what is the likely outcome after an application of the
welfare test under s.1 of the Children Act 1989? The
risks of donation are signiﬁcant, including artery rup-
ture, transfusion, scarring, and anaemia.7–14 Therefore,
any psychological beneﬁt must ‘‘leave the account in
signiﬁcant credit’’ conﬁrmed by Thorpe LJ in Re A
(Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549.
The common law has already rejected two views in
support of bone marrow harvests on children: (i) that it
is acceptable to balance the plight of the sick against the
health of the saviour, and (ii) that it is acceptable to
merge the interests of the saviour with other family
members. Firstly, the court in McKay v Essex Area
Health Authority [1982] QB 1166 refused to measure
the consequence of death, rendering the morbidity of
the sick sibling irrelevant (see Lord Ackner at page
1189 and Lord Griﬃths at page 1192). The U.S.
courts came to the same conclusion in Gleitman v
Cosgrove 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). Lord Morris also
warned of prejudice in S v M [1972] AC 24:
‘‘D is a separate party in the issue which is to be tried.
Her position and her future are at stake. The interests
of the other parties must not be advanced by those
other parties so as to prejudice or to dominate over
the interests of D’’ (at page 53).
Sir John Pennycuick in Re X (A Minor) (Wardship:
Jurisdiction) [1975] Fam 47 later added that any third
parties included in welfare deliberations were not to be
family members (at page 61). The minor was also
placed at the heart of proceedings in Re B (A Minor)
(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199, Re A
(Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1
FLR 549, and Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins:
Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147.
Secondly, the courts have openly rejected a merging
of interests, i.e. the interfamilial principle,4,15–18 unless
both siblings are warded at the same time.
This occurred in Court of Appeal [1993] 1 FLR 883
and Balcombe LJ stated at pages 890–892: ‘‘paramount
means above all others in rank, order or jurisdic-
tion . . . ’’ (see also Evans LJ at page 899). This was
conﬁrmed in Birmingham City Council v H (A Minor)
[1994] 2 AC 212 per Lord Slynn:
‘‘That child is the subject matter of the application. The
question to be determined relates to that child’s
upbringing and it is that child’s welfare which must
be the court’s paramount consideration. The fact that
the [other party] is also a child does not mean that both
[parties’] welfare is paramount and that each has to be
balanced against the other’’ (at page 222).
It is clear that there are to be no balancing exercises and
no merging of interests under the welfare test. The donor
is entitled to stand alone in her paramountcy. We are left
with nothing but a speculative desire for the family unit
to be complete. The law has not conﬁrmed that this is
enough to validate a non-therapeutic medical procedure
on a child. In Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow
Donation) [1997] Fam 110 Connell J validated the har-
vest on an incompetent adult donor on the grounds that
the relationship between Y and her mother would be
improved if the sick sister survived (at pages 115–116).
Conclusion
The HT Authority relies on Gillick competence to val-
idate bone marrow harvests on older child donors.
Gillick has never been conﬁrmed in law as applicable
to non-therapeutic medical procedures, which are dis-
tinguishable from regular diagnostic and therapeutic
treatments because there are no physical beneﬁts, and
any psychological beneﬁts are purely speculative. The
High Court has previously disposed of parental consent
if it is too subjective – the objective best interests of the
donor are paramount in accordance with s.1 of the
Children Act 1989. The courts will not balance the
plight of the sick child against the minimal detriment
to the saviour child, nor will they merge the interests of
several parties via the interfamilial principle unless both
children are warded at the same time.
We are left with a competent child pressured to
undergo an invasive non-therapeutic medical procedure
to save a sibling. Consent may be real, but it is not
conﬁrmed as authoritative in light of the purely specu-
lative social beneﬁt to be achieved. Parental consent is
too fraught to be objective. It is concluded that without
court approval bone marrow harvests on children are
on shaky legal ground.
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